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Introduction
Consider a di¤erentiated product duopoly. The …rms have the option of investing in a new technology which is cost-reducing. This may be a new machine which brings down marginal cost of production (increases e¢ ciency) or a new software which improves product design and e¤ectively reduces costs. The extent of the reduction in marginal cost depends on the quality of the new technology. The following questions arise:
1. Will the …rms adopt this cost-reducing new technology?
Does the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) matter?
In the industrial organisation literature the above questions have been addressed in various ways. However, our approach will be di¤erent. In order to …nd answers to the above questions we consider the following two-stage game.
I am indebted to Masaki Aoyagi, Vijay Kaul, Noriaki Matshushima, Toshihiro Matsumura, Achintya Ray and Makoto Yano for very helpful comments. Comments from the participants at the Aomori Kyoto International Workshop and seminar participants at Tokyo University were also very helpful. The paper was written when I was a 'Visiting Research Scholar' at the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in 2013-14. ISER provided me with excellent research facilites and stimulating intellectual ambience and I am very grateful for that. The usual disclaimer applies. Higher is the quality of the new technology, the lower will be the marginal cost of production. The extent of reduction in marginal cost depends on the e¤ectiveness of the new technology in reducing marginal cost. If a …rm decides to adopt the new technology, it has to purchase it in a scoring auction. This means that both the cost of buying this new technology and the quality of the technology (which a¤ects the marginal cost of production) are no longer given but they depend on the equilibrium outcome in the scoring auction.
2. In the second stage the …rms engage either in Cournot competition or in Bertrand competition in a di¤erentiated product market. The mode of product market competition, Cournot or Bertrand, in the second stage is exogenously determined. The outcome of the scoring auction is revealed to both the …rms before they engage in the second stage duopoly competition. This means that when a …rm engages in second stage competition (Cournot or Bertrand) it knows the quality choice (and hence the marginal cost) of its rival.
We …nd that the equilibrium outcome crucially depends on whether or not the quality of the new technology o¤ered by the suppliers lies in the interior of [0; x].
In sharp contrast to the related results in the literature we show that both …rms choose to adopt the new technology in the …rst stage when the quality of the new technology o¤ered by the suppliers lies in the interior of [0; x]. This is true regardless of the value of di¤erentiation parameter and regardless of the nature of second stage competition (Cournot or Bertrand). However, when there is a corner solution (where all the suppliers o¤er quality x) then it is possible to have an equilibrium where only one …rm (or no …rm) adopts the new technology. With corner solution in quality, in some cases the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) makes a di¤erence to the equilibrium outcomes. We show that this depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation and the expected cost of acquiring the new technology. It may be noted that with corner solution, our results are somewhat closer to the existing ones in the literature.
The novelty of our paper is that we use 'scoring auction'as a mechanism to buy new technology. In all papers in the related literature …rms adopt the new technology either by incurring a …xed cost (as in Bester and Petrakis (1993) , Pal (2010) and Elberfeld and Nti (2004) ) or by participating in a 'standard auction'(as in Das-Verma (2003) and Moldovanu and Sela (2003) ).
Why Scoring auction?
In the traditional theory of standard procurement auctions, the buyer (auctioneer) cares only about the price of the object, but not the other attributes. 1 However, in many procurement situations, the buyer cares about attributes other than price when evaluating the o¤ ers submitted by suppliers. Non-monetary attributes that buyers care about include quality, time to completion etc. For example, in the contract for the construction of a new aircraft, the speci…cation of its characteristics is probably as important as its price (see Branco, 1997) . Under these circumstances, auctions are usually multidimensional: bidders submit bids with the relevant characteristics of the project (among which is price), then the procurement agency gives a score to each bid and makes its decisions based on these scores. The essential element of such multidimensional auctions is a scoring rule. For example, the Department of Defence in USA often relies on competitive source selection to procure weapon systems (see Che, 1993) . Each individual component of a bid of the weapon system is evaluated and assigned a score, these scores are summed to yield a total score, and the …rm achieving the highest score wins the contract.
In our set-up any …rm which is planning to buy the new technology cares both about the price of the new technology and the quality that is o¤ered. The reason is simple: both the price and quality of the new technology a¤ects the pro…t of the …rm. The price of the new technology is like a …xed cost and the quality of the new technology directly a¤ects the marginal cost of production. For example, if the …rms are airline companies then they may invest in new aircraft with fuel e¢ cient engines. The more fuel e¢ cient the engines of the new aircraft are, the more will be the savings in fuel costs (which e¤ectively means that marginal cost of operating a ‡ight comes down). Such airline companies evaluate o¤ers from suppliers of new aircraft based on not only the prices of the aircraft but also on the quality of new fuel e¢ cient engines. In a country like India where fuel costs are very high, airlines greatly value the fuel cost savings. Airline companies in India typically purchase new aircraft after evaluating competing o¤ers (that include price as well as various quality parameters) from big aircraft suppliers like Boeing and Airbus. 2 We now proceed to provide a brief discussion of the related papers in the literature and show how our exercise di¤ers from these papers.
The related literature Our two stage game is somewhat close to the approach in Bester and Petrakis (1993) and Pal (2010) . In these two papers the basic model is as follows. First, one …rm (or both …rms) decides (decide) whether or not to adopt a cost-reducing technology, by incurring some given cost. If a …rm adopts a cost-reducing technology, the reduction in marginal cost is discrete and known. Next, the …rms engage either in Cournot competition or in Bertrand competition. 3 Bester and Petrakis (1993) show that Cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than Bertrand competition if the degree of product di¤erentiation is low, and a weaker incentive if this degree is high. Pal (2010) shows that, if the given …xed cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the given cost-reducing e¤ect of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the technology is low, Cournot competition fares better than Bertrand competition in terms of technology adoption by …rms.
Note that in the above papers …rms have to incur some given …xed cost to adopt the new technology and the reduction in marginal cost is also given. That is, both the price of the new technology and the associated reduction in marginal cost are known to the …rms in the beginning. In contrast, in our model, neither the price of the new technology nor the reduction in marginal cost are known to the …rms at the start. Firms come to know of these only after the outcome of the scoring auction has been revealed.
Another set of papers (for example, Elberfeld and Nti, 2004 ) deal with the case where the reduction in marginal cost is itself uncertain. Here a …rm may either undertake an up-front in-vestment to adopt the new technology with low marginal cost, or it may continue to use the old technology with high marginal cost. The cost of adoption of such a new technology is given. After technological commitments have been made, uncertainty in marginal cost is resolved, and the …rms play a Cournot oligopoly game. 4 It is shown that if in equilibrium both technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases (decreases) the number of innovating …rms and decreases (increases) the product price if the up-front investment is large (small). In Elberfeld and Nti (2004) the second stage competition is Cournot only and consequently, the issues regarding di¤erences due to nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) do not arise.
Note that in Elberfeld and Nti (2004) the cost of the new technology is given but the reduction in marginal cost (due to adoption of new technology) is uncertain. In contrast, in our model, before the outcome of the scoring auction is known, both the cost of the new technology and the quality of the new technology (and consequently the reduction in marginal cost) are uncertain.
There is yet another set of papers in the literature in which there is …rst an auction for a patent and then the equilibrium outcome of this auction in ‡uences the future interaction (oligopoly game) among agents. For example, in Das-Verma (2003) and Moldovanu and Sela (2003) a costreducing process innovation protected by a patent is sold to one of several …rms. The …rms bid non-cooperatively for this process innovation. Following the auction, in the second stage of the game, the …rms compete against each other in an imperfectly competitive product market. The process innovation won from the …rst stage auction lowers the winning bidder's cost in the product market. The value of the patent for a …rm is the di¤erence between the pro…t it makes in case it acquires the patent, and the pro…t in case it does not. 5 Das-Verma (2003) examines whether a …rst-price, sealed-bid auction is e¢ cient in allocating a process innovation amongst oligopolists engaged in either Cournot or Bertrand competition and shows that for Cournot, there exists a symmetric, unique equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies (that are allocatively e¢ cient). For Bertrand, such an e¢ cient equilibrium may not exist. The paper by Moldovanu and Sela (2003) considers several …rms engaged in price competition under conditions of asymmetric information about production costs. Incomplete information about production costs yields an auction model with both private and common value components. The main result in this paper is that standard auction mechanisms lead to ine¢ cient allocations.
Like Das-Verma (2003) and Moldovanu and Sela (2003) we have an auction prior to product market competition. But ours is a scoring auction whereas these papers use a standard auction. In these papers there is a reduction only in the winning bidder's cost in the product market. In our set-up any …rm can choose to reduce its marginal cost by purchasing the new technology in a scoring auction. The new technology is not protected by any patent. Hence, in our model it is possible to have a scenario where both …rms reduce marginal costs by adopting the new technology. Moreover, unlike Das-Verma (2003) and Moldovanu and Sela (2003) , in our model the reduction in marginal cost does not depend on …rms'types but on the quality of the new technology.
Plan of the paper In section 2 we provide the model of our exercise. Section 3 gives the equilibrium analysis of scoring auction. In section 4 we discuss the second-stage equilibrium in the product market. Section 5 provides our major results. We analyse whether in equilibrium, the …rms choose the new technology or not. We do so both for the case where the quality of the new technology o¤ered by the suppliers lies in the interior of [0; x] and for the case when there is a corner solution (where the suppliers o¤er quality x). Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. Lastly, the appendix provides the proofs of most of our propositions.
We now proceed to provide the model of our exercise.
The Model
We consider the following two-stage game.
Stage 1 : Firm 1 and …rm 2 simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to adopt the new technology. There are n suppliers of the new technology. A …rm has to buy the technology in a 'scoring auction'.
Stage 2 : Firms 1 and 2 engage either in Cournot competition or in Bertrand competition in a di¤erentiated product market.
First stage scoring auction A …rm i which decides to adopt the new technology solicits bids from n suppliers. Each bid is two-dimensional. It speci…es an o¤er of promised quality, x and price, , at which a …xed quantity of products with the o¤ered level of quality x is delivered. The quantity is normalised to one. For simplicity quality is modelled as a one-dimensional attribute. The quality of the technology is x and x 2 [0; x] :
The cost of supplying the new technology is given by (x; i ) = x i where i is the type of the supplier i.
Prior to bidding each supplier i learns its cost parameter i as private information. The buyer and other suppliers (i.e. other than supplier i) do not observe i but only knows the distribution function of the cost parameter. It is assumed that i is identically and independently distributed over ; where 0 < < . The distribution function of i is given by F (:) and the density function by f (:).
Let S (x; ) = s (x) denote a scoring rule for an o¤er (x; ), where s (:) is strictly increasing in x. The rule is assumed to be publicly known to the suppliers of the new technology at the start of bidding. In our model s (x) is equal to the second-stage gross pro…t of the …rm seeking the new technology. This pro…t depends on (i) the nature of the second stage competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and on (ii) whether the …rm and its rival have chosen the new technology or not. Also, in our model is the amount paid by the technology seeking …rm to the supplier winning the contract. That is, is like a …xed cost of purchasing the technology. Consequently, the second-stage net pro…t of the …rm is s (x) . The …rm awards the contract to a supplier whose o¤er achieves the highest score. This is similar to a standard auction. In this paper we will model only …rst-score auction. In a …rst-score auction the winning supplier's o¤er is …nalised as the contract. 6 Second-stage duopoly competition For the second-stage competition we consider a representative consumer's utility function based on Dixit (1979) On the demand side of the market, the representative consumer's utility function of two di¤er-entiated products, q 1 and q 2 , and a numeraire good, q 0 is given by
The parameter measures the degree of product di¤erentiation. We consider the case of substitute goods: 0 < < 1. Lower value of denotes higher degree of product di¤erentiation, i.e., lower degree of substitutability between products. Note that when is close to unity then the products are nearly homogeneous (perfect substitutes) and when is close to zero the products are nearly independent
The utility function generates the system of linear demand functions
The inverse demand functions are
Initially (before the adoption of new technology) the marginal cost of production of …rms 1 and 2 is c.
We assume the following:
. This ensures that both …rms produce strictly positive output in equilibrium in Cournot competition as well as in Bertrand competition for all possible cases.
If …rm 1 adopts the new technology of quality x its marginal cost reduces to c (1 k (x)) where k 1, (0) = 0, 0 (x) > 0 for all x > 0 and k (x) 1 for all x. If …rm 2 adopts the new technology of quality x its marginal cost reduces to c (1 (x)). Note that (x) denotes the e¤ ectiveness of the new technology in reducing marginal cost. Since k 1 …rm 1 is more competent at reducing marginal cost. Note that x = 0 is equivalent to not adopting the new technology.
Before giving our main results we need to provide some preliminaries on order statistics.
Order Statistics : some notations and preliminaries
Let y 1 ; y 2 ::y n denote a random sample of size n drawn from F (:): Then t 1 t 2 ::: t n where t i s are y i s arranged in increasing magnitudes, are de…ned to be the order statistics corresponding to the random sample y 1 ; y 2 ::::y n :
We would be interested in t 1 (lowest order statistic) and t 2 (second lowest order statistic). The corresponding distribution functions and density functions are F 1 (:); F 2 (:) and f 1 (:); f 2 (:):
Note that
and f 2 (t) = n(n 1)F (t) (1 F (t)) n 2 f (t)
Equilibrium in scoring auction
Each auction rule can be viewed as a Bayesian game where each supplier picks a quality-price combination (x; ) as a function of its cost parameter. We now provide the …rst result (from Che, 1993).
Lemma 1 A unique symmetric equilibrium of a …rst-score auction is one in which each supplier with type o¤ ers
s ( ) is strictly decreasing in the …rm with lowest type ( ) wins the contract in equilibrium 7 .
We will assume that x s ( ) > 0 for all 2 ; . This ensures that even the least e¢ cient supplier whose type is of the new technology quotes positive quality index in equilibrium. The expected payo¤ to …rm i which chooses the new technology is the expected value of (s (x) ), where s (x) is the second-stage pro…t. Now using lemma 1 we get
We now provide our next result which also follows from Che (1993) . In the appendix we provide a much simpler proof.
Lemma 2 The expected payo¤ to …rm i in a …rst-score auction is as follows:
We will need lemma 2 to prove some of our main results. 7 See Che (1993) for the formal demonstration.
Equilibrium in the second stage
The mode of product market competition, Cournot or Bertrand, in the second stage is exogenously determined. The outcome of the scoring auction (held in the …rst stage) is revealed to both the …rms before they engage in the second stage duopoly competition. This means that when a …rm engages in second stage competition (Cournot or Bertrand) it knows the quality choice (and hence the marginal cost) of its rival.
At the end of …rst-stage there are three possible cases : (i) no …rm has adopted the technology (ii) only one …rm, either …rm 1 or …rm 2, has adopted the technology (iii) both of them have adopted the technology.
We use the following notations for equilibrium outcomes ('C'stands for 'choose the new technology'and 'D'stands for 'don't choose'): 
Cournot competition
We …rst analyse the case when there is quantity competition in the second stage. Let x i and i respectively be the equilibrium quality obtained and the payment made by …rm i in the …rst-stage if it adopts the technology.
Cournot quantities and pro…ts are denoted by q i and i respectively.
The equilibrium outcomes in stage 2 in the case of quantity competition in the product market, given the technology adoption decisions of …rms, are as follows.
When no …rm adopts the new technology:
2. When both …rms adopt the new technology:
3. When …rm 1 adopts the new technology but …rm 2 does not:
4. When …rm 2 adopts the new technology but …rm 1 does not:
Bertrand competition
We now analyse the case when there is price competition in the second stage. Let y i and i respectively be the equilibrium quality obtained and the payment made by …rm i in the …rst-stage if it adopts the technology. Bertrand prices, quantities and pro…ts are denoted by p i , b i and B i respectively. When …rms compete in terms of price in the product market in stage 2, given the technology adoption decisions of …rms of stage 1, the equilibrium outcomes are as follows.
1. When no …rm adopts the new technology:
When both …rms adopt the new technology:
Equilibrium in the …rst-stage
In the …rst stage when …rm i decides to choose the new technology or not, its choice is dictated by the expected value of its net payo¤ in the second stage. For example, if …rm 1 goes for the new technology and 2 also does so, then expected net payo¤ to 1 is Z
Using lemma 2 we know that Z
and so on.
Then in the …rst stage the choices before the two …rms can be summarised as follows. The …rst payo¤ matrix deals with the case of quantity competition and the second one deals with the case of price competition.
Bertrand

Equilibrium when quality of the new technology lies in the interior
We now proceed to provide our …rst set of major results when the quality of the new technology o¤ered by the suppliers lies in the interior of [0; x].
(a c)(2 ) for all x 2 (0; x) and x s ( ) 2 (0; x) for all 2 ; then the following is true.
Proof Given in the appendix.
(a c) (2 ) for all x 2 (0; x) and x s ( ) 2 (0; x) for all 2 ; then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, where it is a strictly dominant strategy for both …rms to adopt the new technology in the …rst stage regardless of the nature of second stage competition (Cournot or Bertrand).
Proof The proof is straightforward and follows directly from proposition 1 and the payo¤ matrix provided in section 5.
Comment We now provide a simple intuition behind our result. Given the rival's decision, if …rm i does not choose the new technology its marginal cost remains at c. Note that non-adoption of the new technology is equivalent to choosing
We now compare and contrast our result to the related results in the literature. Bester and Petrakis (1993) investigate how the incentives for cost reduction in a di¤erentiated industry depend upon the degree of product di¤erentiation. This paper shows that Cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than Bertrand competition if the degree of product di¤erentiation is low, and a weaker incentive if this degree is high. Pal (2010) shows that, if the given …xed cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the given cost-reducing e¤ect of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the technology is low, Cournot competition fares better than Bertrand competition in terms of technology adoption by …rms. 8 In sharp contrast to the related results in the literature we show that the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) has no e¤ ect on the equilibrium decision of the …rms to adopt the new technology when the quality of the new technology o¤ ered by the suppliers lies in the interior of [0; x]. In our model both …rms chooses to adopt the new technology in the …rst stage regardless of the value of in the relevant range and regardless of the nature of second stage competition (Cournot or Bertrand).
Equilibrium when quality of the new technology is x
The previous section dealt with the case where the quality of the new technology o¤ered by the suppliers lies in the interior of [0; x]. Now we attempt to analyse the case when there is a corner solution (where the suppliers o¤er quality x). We show that it is possible to have an equilibrium outcome like where either (i) none of the …rms adopts the new technology or (ii) where only one of the …rms adopts the new technology. We now provide our next result.
Lemma 3 If
00 (x) 0 for all x 2 (0; x) then x s ( ) = x for all 2 ; . This is true regardless of the nature of second stage competition (Cournot or Bertrand).
In this case (when 00 (x) 0), any supplier of the new technology, regardless of its type, o¤er x in equilibrium. In the scoring auction equilibrium we have the following:
x s ( ) = x for all 2 ; :
And as before
That is, z is the expected value of the second lowest type. Now note the following:
Similarly we can compute^ (ii) 9 unique 2 (1; 1) s.t.
(a c)
remark 2 For the rest of the paper we will assume that 00 (x) 0 for all x 2 (0; x). From lemma 3 we know that this means any supplier of the new technology, regardless of its type, o¤ ers x in equilibrium. This implies that when a …rm chooses to adopt the new technology, it knows with certainty both the quality ( x) of the new technology and also the associated decrease in marginal cost of production. This aspect is very di¤ erent from our previous case where the quality o¤ ered by the suppliers lies in the interior of [0; x]. However, as in the previous case, before the outcome of the scoring auction is known, the …rms do not know with certainty the cost of the new technology.
Now note that following results.
Now note that
The next two results provide conditions under which either (C; C) is the equilibrium outcome or (D; D) is the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3 (i) If
then both …rms adopting the new technology is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium when …rms engage in quantity competition in the second stage. That is, the equilibrium outcome in the …rst stage is (C; C).
(ii) If
2k xz then both …rms adopting the new technology is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium when …rms engage in price competition in the second stage. That is, the equilibrium outcome in the …rst stage is (C; C).
Comment From Proposition 3 it follows that for any given 2 0; and c, when a is large enough then (C; C) is always the unique equilibrium outcome for both quantity and price competition. The intuition behind this is simple. a can be thought of as proxy for market size. When market size is large enough any …rm has an incentive to lower marginal cost and, thereby increasing it's market share as tapping the large market fetches more gains as compared to the additional cost of purchasing the new technology.
We now show that is also possible to have equilibria where no …rm chooses to adopt the new technology.
then both …rms not adopting the new technology is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium when …rms engage in quantity competition in the second stage. That is, the equilibrium outcome in the …rst stage is (D; D).
then both …rms not adopting the new technology is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium when …rms engage in price competition in the second stage. That is, the equilibrium outcome in the …rst stage is (D; D).
Comment Proposition 4 shows that for any given 2 0;
and any a, if c is small enough then (D; D) is always the unique equilibrium outcome for both quantity and price competition. The intuition behind this is simple. When c is very small, then even without adopting the new technology, a …rm's costs are low and hence the incentive to lower it further is not there as it has to incur an additional …xed cost (of purchasing it).
We now show that in both quantity and price competition, it is also possible to have equilibria where one …rm chooses to adopt the new technology whereas the other …rm does not.
Quantity competition
We …rst deal with Cournot competition. First, consider the following four terms:
, and ^ depends on whether k is higher than k or not.
We now provide the main results with quantity competition and corner solution in quality. First note that when k 2 (1; k) then^
Proposition 5 Suppose k 2 (1; k) and there is quantity competition in the second stage.
(i) If either^
then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where …rm 1 chooses to adopt but …rm 2 does not. That is, the equilibrium outcome in the …rst stage is (C; D).
(ii) If^
then there are two subgame perfect equilibria where one …rm chooses to adopt but the other does not. That is, the equilibrium outcome in the …rst stage is either (C; D) or (D; C).
Proof The proof follows directly from the payo¤ matrix provided in section 5.
Note that lemma 5 also shows that when k 2 (k; 1) then^
and there is quantity competition in the second stage.
Bertrand Competition
We next consider price competition. The results are very similar. The proofs of propositions 7 and 8 follow directly from the payo¤ matrix provided in section 5.
As before consider the following four terms: B CD 
(ii) IfB
Lemma 5 also shows that when
Proposition 8 Suppose k 2 ( ; 1) and there is price competition in the second stage.
Comment Note that k represents …rm 1's relative competence vis-a-vis …rm 2. Since k 1 …rm 1 is more competent than …rm 2. Hence, when k is high enough (i.e. either k > k in quantity competition or k > in price competition), then it is never an equilibrium outcome where …rm 1 does not adopt the new technology but …rm 2 does. This arises because …rm 1 is far more adept than …rm 2 at reducing marginal cost. When k is low enough (i.e. k 2 (1; k) in quantity competition or k 2 (1; ) in price competition) and if it's the case that the outcome (D; D) does not arise in equilibrium, then for all feasible parameter values there is always an equilibrium where …rm 1 adopts the new technology in equilibrium.
Cournot vs Bertrand
We proceed to explore the question as to whether the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) make a di¤erence. We show that the nature of competition sometimes make a di¤erence in the case when there is a corner solution (where the suppliers o¤er quality x).
In Cournot competition, a reduction in …rm i's unit cost increases its output, q i , and decreases it rivals output, q j . Total supply, q i + q j , is increased. This particular e¤ect is strategically advantageous for …rm i. On the other hand, in Bertrand competition, a reduction in …rm i's unit cost decreases price of both …rms. This is strategically disadvantageous for …rm i because its output is positively related to the other …rm's price. This implies that in contrast with Cournot competition, Bertrand competition creates a negative strategic incentive to adopt a new technology. However, it may be noted that the gains from a cost reduction not only depend on the strategic e¤ect but also on how much total production costs are decreased. Therefore, if price competition results in a higher output than quantity competition, it may be the case that Bertrand competition induces a greater overall incentive to adopt a new technology than Cournot competition. 9 We now come to our next result. Proof Given in the appendix. Now from lemma 6 we know that the following scenarios are possible: (i) 2 0;
Lemma 6 If
This brings us to our next main result. The proof follows directly from the payo¤ matrix provided in section 5. Comment Proposition 9 shows that when the degree of substitutability ( ) is low then (D; D) is the only equilibrium under Bertrand competition whereas it is never an equilibrium under Cournot competition. Also, when the degree of substitutability ( ) is high then (D; D) is the only equilibrium under Cournot competition whereas it is never an equilibrium under Bertrand. This conclusion is somewhat similar to Bester and Petrakis (1993) where it is shown that Cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than Bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability ( ) is low, and a weaker incentive if this degree is high.
The intuition behind this result is related to the di¤erences in the strategic e¤ects under Cournot and Bertrand competition. 10 Note that when = 0, price and quantity decisions result in the same outcome. For low values of the type of market competition has only a small impact on …rm i's output. This implies that the gain from reducing total cost does not di¤er very much in the two categories of equilibrium (Bertrand or Cournot) when is low. Consequently, the strategic e¤ect dominates and new technology adoption becomes relatively more attractive under Cournot competition.
The following may now be noted.
Lemma 7
The following inequality holds true for any k 1 and for any 2 0; .
From lemma 7 it is clear that the following is a possibility.
The above is equivalent to
We now come to our last main result. The proof follows directly from the payo¤ matrix provided in section 5.
then under Cournot competition (C; C) is the unique equilibrium outcome. Under Bertrand competition at most one …rm chooses to adopt the new technology in equilibrium.
Comment From lemma 5 we know that the term ^
is the lowest among the four terms:
. As noted before, we havê
Since xz is the expected cost of acquiring the new technology it means that when ^
> 0 then the cost of the new technology is relatively low. In proposition 10 we get that under Cournot competition (C; C) is the unique equilibrium outcome. But under Bertrand competition at most one …rm chooses to adopt the new technology in equilibrium. That is, the incentive to invest in a new technology is higher under Cournot when its cost ( xz) is relatively low. This is somewhat similar to Pal (2010) .
A simple intuition behind our result is as follows. 11 Following technology adoption, Bertrand competition not only leads to lower prices (strategic e¤ect), but also results in a lower market share of the non-adopting …rm (selection e¤ect) than Cournot competition. We have noted earlier that the strategic e¤ect provides more incentive to adopt technology under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. However, the selection e¤ect works in the opposite direction.
Note that when only one …rm adopts the cost-reducing technology, the selection e¤ect dominates the strategic e¤ect and as a result new technology adoption is more attractive under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. On the other hand, if both …rms adopt the technology, the selection e¤ect disappears and the gain from technology adoption are higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. A …rm's gain from technology adoption is clearly higher when only that particular …rm adopts the technology. Therefore, when the cost of the technology is relatively low, in equilibrium, both …rms adopt the technology under Cournot competition whereas it's not so under Bertrand competition.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by …rms in a horizontally di¤erentiated industry under two alternative categories of product market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. Our approach is di¤erent from the related papers in the literature. We consider a two-stage game. In the …rst stage …rms simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to adopt the new technology. In the second stage the …rms engage either in Cournot competition or in Bertrand competition in a di¤erentiated product market. In our model there are several suppliers of a new technology. The quality of the new technology lies in the interval [0; x]. Higher is the quality, the lower will be the marginal cost. The extent of the cost reduction depends on the quality of the new technology. A …rm has to buy the technology in a 'scoring auction'. This means that both the cost of buying this new technology and the quality of the technology (which a¤ects the marginal cost of production) are no longer given but they depend on the equilibrium outcome in the scoring auction.
In contrast to results in the literature we show the following:
1. 
Changing the order of integration we can write (1) as
Using (2) we now get
Then using the envelope theorem we get that
From (3) we can now write
Hence, from (3) and (5) we get that
This completes proof of lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1 We will …rst show that^
The rest of the inequalities can be proved using exactly similar logic.
Step 1 We will show that x CC 2 ( ) < x DC 2 ( ) for all 2 ; . From lemma 1 we know that for any 2 ; ,
We have (6) since, as noted earlier, in this particular case s (x) is the gross second stage pro…t when both …rms choose the new technology. Since x s ( ) 2 (0; x) for all 2 ; , x CC 2 ( ) is the solution in x of the following (1OC and 2OC):
(7a) and (7b) imply that x CC 2 ( ) is the solution in x of the following:
Since k 1 and
(a c) (2 ) for all x 2 (0; x), (8b) will always be satis…ed. Similarly, x DC 2 ( ) is the solution in x of the following:
Again, since k 1 and
(a c) (2 ) for all x 2 (0; x), (9b) will always be satis…ed. Note that since x s ( ) 2 (0; x) for all 2 ; , we must have x CC 1 ( ) > 0. This means that LHS of (8a) is strictly lower than the LHS of (9a). Moreover, from (8b) and (9b) we get that the both the LHS of (8a) and (9a) are strictly decreasing in x. Hence, we get that x CC 2 ( ) < x DC 2 ( ) for all 2 ; .
Step 2 Using a logic similar to the one used in (8a) and (8b) we get that x CC 1 ( ) is the solution in x of the following:
As before, (10b) will always be satis…ed. We know that^
Note that when …rm 1 computes its expected payo¤ ^ 
From (11) and (12) we get^
Using (10a) we get can write the above as
Hence, we get that 
Step 3 
From (17) and (18) we get that g (x) > 0 for all x 2 (0; x)
This means for any 2 ; g x
Using (20) in (14) we get that Proof of Lemma 3 We will prove it for the case where both …rms choose the new technology. the other cases can be proved similarly. From lemma 1 we know that for any 2 ; , x CC 1 ( ) solves (26) implies 9 unique k 2 (1; 1) s.t. h (k) = 0. This proves lemma 4 (i). Part (ii) of lemma 4 can be proved using similar logic.
Proof of Lemma 5
We know that^
. From lemma 3 we get that when 00 (x) 0 for all x 2 (0; x), x CC 1 ( ) = x CC 2 ( ) = x DC 2 ( ) = x. Note that z = R f 2 ( ) :
Using (27) and (28) we get that
Proof of lemma 6 Note that
Let l ( ) = 2 (a c) (1 ) ck ( x)
Note that l (0) = 2 (a c) > 0, l (1) = ck ( x) < 0 and l 0 ( ) < 0 for all 2 (0; 1)
From (37) and (38) From (36) we know that
using (39) and (40) 
